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THE likeness of parts of the Securities Act to the corresponding pro-
visions of the British Companies Act of 1928-9 has caused many
reviewers of the Securities Act to compare it, either incidentally or fully,
with the cognate provisions of the English Act.' A more comprehensive
comparative study, including the most important Continental legal sys-
tems, has not yet been written. This article attempts that study.
Before going into the details of comparison, it seems necessary to
point out the peculiar difficulties which have to be overcome in this field
of investigation. First, the mechanisms employed in the different con-
tinental legal systems to protect the investor, unlike those of the Securi-
ties Act, are not bodies of rational thoughts, but are comparable rather
to an old, badly constructed building, which has been more and more
enlarged in the course of generations. They differ materially not only
in details but also in the main lines, so that it is very difficult to give a
survey which evades the scylla of being too abstract and general, as
well as the charybdis of incorporating too many perplexing details. Sec-
ond, the fact that it is necessary in the interest of avoiding the overload-
ing of the article to limit the analysis to only the most important and in-
teresting continental securities legislation raises the difficulty that the
selection of the legislation cannot be free from some arbitrariness. Third,
a fruitful comparison demands that the study should not remain purely on
the legalistic level, but should give a report of the practical experiences
under the different legal systems. But as soon as we leave the legalistic
level, the difficulties are increased. Most of the statements relating to the
efficiency of legal provisions are to be met with the utmost caution, be-
cause very often their authors are not at all impartial. Either they are
tPrivatdozent at the Handelshochschule, Berlin; Rockefeller Fellow doing rLamrch work
at Yale School of Law; author of treatises and articles in German legal periodicals, dealing
with comparative law and other subjects.
1. Bates, (November 1933) Bulletin of the Harvard Business School Alumni A-odation
31; Barnett, The Securities Act of 1933 and the British Companies Act (1935) 13 HAnv.
Bus. Ry. 1; Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: I1 (1933) 8 FoarTmn 53; Hanna
and Turlington, The Secuwies Act of 1933 (1933) 7 So. CA=r,. L. Rv. 18.
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consciously or subconsciously, on account of their social standing, repre-
sentatives of economic groups interested in the preservation of the status
quo,2 or their attacks on the prevailing system made for the most part in
general terms, are more the expression of a sympathetic enthusiasm than
of a complete insight into the complex situation. We find for example,
that distinguished French authors admire certain rules of the German law,
advocating their introduction into the French system while the same
rules are not at all approved by competent German writers.
The best method of getting a proper basis for our investigation seems
to be to begin with the aims of the Securities Act and the means which
the American legislator has deemed suitable to accomplish his aims. As
has been pointed out repeatedly, the Securities Act tries to put at the
disposal of an investor all the information which is deemed necessary to
enable him to form an intelligent judgment regarding the merits of a
security. One may add to this function the further one of protecting the
investor against misstatements or omissions in the sale of securities.
For our present purpose it is sufficient to state that the Act tries to accom-
plish its purpose by prescribing that no offer for the interstate sale of
any security covered by the Act can be made either by the issuer or by
an underwriter or dealer, unless a registration statement, giving a large
amount of information about the security to be issued, is filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and has become effective, and a
prospectus summarizing the information in the registration statement
has been handed over to the buyer. The requirements relating to complete
registration statements and prospectuses are fortified by civil and penal
provisions relating to misstatements and omissions. In addition to the
rules requiring registration, the Act contains general provisions penalizing
any untrue statement in sales of any security, whether the registration
and prospectus requirements were applicable to their issuance or not,
supplementing in this respect many state blue-sky laws and the common
law. The Act regulates only the issuance of new securities, the protection
of the investor in connection with subsequent trading in them being pro-
vided by the Securities Exchange Act. Though the provisions of the
latter are not included in this article, the provisions of the Continental
laws which correspond to it could not be entirely left out of the picture.
They are dealt with only in a very summary way, insofar as it is neces-
sary to complete the picture. Very often the provisions of the Continental
legal systems which are to be dealt with can only be fairly appreciated
if one takes into account the manner of, and the extent to which they are
supplemented by rules and regulations contained in the different stock
exchange laws.
2. vON NELL-BRUENING, AKTENGESF.LLscHAEr UND MoRAL (13 Geselischaftarechtliche
Abhandlungen, herausgegeben von Arthur Nussbaum, 1930) 8 et seq.
3. See infra page 1151.
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The provisions of the Securities Act not only try to protect those
persons who want to invest their money in shares and bonds issued by
corporations, but extend their protection to all sorts of other securities
purchases, issued by natural persons, partnerships, committees and trusts.
Here we are facing the first important discrepancy between the Ameri-
can Act and most of the Continental legal systems. The Securities Act
is much more comprehensive, not only than the English Companies Act'
but also than all Continental statutes including even the French statute
of January 30, 1907, which adopted a very extended protective system.5
The majority of the Continental statutes have built up provisions for the
protection of the investor in stocks; a relatively smaller group of statutes
extends the provisions to purchases of bonds;' and only a very small
group, following the French example, go still further, the protective pro-
visions being applicable whenever securities negotiable on the stock ex-
change or through banks are offered to the public by any business associa-
tion, be it a corporation, a partnership, or the like.7 The following in-
vestigation will deal only with the provisions relating to purchases of
stock, the provisions relating to bonds, so far as they exist, being in the
main the same.
A comparative study of those parts of the Securities Act which have
been created for the protection of an investor who buys shares of a cor-
poration should not lose sight of the fact that the Securities Act is not a
general incorporation statute. It leaves the various corporation laws un-
touched on principle, but brings uniformity into that part of the corpora-
tion system in which uniformity is of the greatest value to the investor.
Since State legislation on securities had failed to check the distribution
of unsound securities, partly on account of the variance in the require-
ments of the several state statutes," it was found necessary that the
federal act unify the laws relating to securities issued, insofar as these
matters are subject to the legislative power of Congress under the in-
terstate commerce clause. On the other hand, the continental statutes
are, with the exception of the French and Belgian laws, not Securities
acts, but corporation statutes. This structural difference of the respec-
tive acts accounts for many of the principal discrepancies in the different
protective systems. We will deal with them before going into the details
of comparison.
4. Barnett, supra note 1, at 2. 5. See infra pages 1140, 1144.
6. Belgium: Law of July 22, 1913, MoNimUR July 25, 1913, art. 82. France: Law
of January 30, 1907, 405 Bulletin des Lois 1433, art. 3.
7. France: Law of January 30, 1907, 405 Bulletin des Lois 1433, art. 3 and the comment
in 2 Hopn'T et Bosvrnux, Tz=9 GgnA Drs Socrfrfs (6th ed. 1929) n. 1504 et ecq.
8. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on the Securities
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The fact that the protective provisions in most of the continental legal
systems form a part of their corporation law influences the mechanism
of protection. They are more closely connected and attuned to the in-
dividual corporation laws than is the Securities Act. The protective pro-
visions of the continental legal systems reflect, therefore, the peculiarities
of the Continental corporation laws and the differences of the latter from
the Anglo-American systems. In this connection, it is necessary to un-
derstand a fundamental distinction between the American and the Con-
tinental methods of capitalization of business corporations. According
to the American corporation laws, a corporation must usually first be
organized before stock may be offered for subscription in exchange for
property or cash. If the corporation needs capital after this first issu-
ance of stock, the capital can be raised either by selling portions of the
unissued shares, or, if it possesses no more unissued shares, by amending
the certificate of incorporation so as to increase the capitalization. Ac-
cording to most continental statutes, however, the corporation does not
come into existence before the whole capital stock is subscribed.' Con-
sequently, the raising of the needed capital can take place in only two
ways: either during the process of the organization of the corporation,
or by the increase of the capital stock after the creation of the corpora-
tion. The latter method, necessitating change in the articles of associa-
tion, which fix the amount of the capital stock,10 is ordinarily available
only when the original capital has been fully paid in. 1 The third method,
that of disposing from time to time of unissued shares to meet the need
for capital, is, subject to a few exceptions, not open to continental cor-
porations, because the continental legal systems do not recognize the dis-
tinction between authorized and outstanding capital.1 2
9. France: Law of July 24, 1867, 234 Bulletin des Lois 94, art. 1, 24; Germany:
Handelsgesetzbuch (1897, 1931) § 189; Switzerland: Obligationenrecht (1911) art. 618.
The single phases of the founding process of a corporation under the continental laws are
the following: 1. drawing up of the articles of association. 2. subscription of shares.
3. payment of the first instalment on the subscription. 4. election of the board of
directors and, in some countries, election of the board of supervisors. S. filing of all
important documents (including the articles of association and the subscription contracts)
with a governmental body (in most states the judge in charge of the Commercial Register)
and, in addition to the filing, in most states registration of the corporation in a commercial
register and public announcement of the creation of the corporation. 2 K. W=LAND,
HAsDEr.s amc (1931) 52 et seq.; concerning the French law. See, however, supra note -
10. See, for example, Belgium: Law of July 22, 1913, Moniteur July 25, 1913, art. 72;
and Germany: Handelsgesetzbuch (1897, 1931) § 182.
11. Austria: AXTnwREurATv (1899, 1925) § 31; Germany, HAVELSSEsrznucn (1897,
1931) § 278; for further references see HALsTEu, Dn AxnrNREc Tn DER GEorsWA T
(1931) 183. (
12. There is, however, a growing tendency to adopt this distinction. See, for example,
the German ENTWURF FNaEs Gn EZs uEBE AxTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN uND KXOMIANDT-
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This difference in methods of capitalization has a direct bearing upon
the scope as well as upon the mechanism of disclosure of information to
investors. The continental protective systems must be differentiated
according to the different groups of investors sought to be protected. The
continental method of capitalization during the organizing of the corpora-
tion influences the provisions purporting to protect subscribers of the ori-
ginal capital stock, that is, investors who subscribe to the shares of stock
before the corporation comes into existence, or, to be more accurate, be-
fore the filing of all the important documents, including the articles of
association and the subscription contracts, and the registration or an-
nouncement of the creation of the corporation.' 3 Since the corporation
has not yet come into being at the time of the subscription for the original
capital stock and since the registration follows the subscription, the con-
tinental legislatures cannot make use of the "registration statement" as
a device of disclosure to protect the subscriber to that stock. Therefore,
the articles of association, being the certificate of incorporation and the
by-laws all in one, 4 and being, except under the French law,"" drawn
up before the capital stock is issued for subscription, play the role of the
registration statement. In the United States, however, subscribers to the
original capital stock can be protected by an exhaustive and detailed
registration statement giving information about an already existent cor-
poration, although, obviously, the registration statement of a newly
founded corporation cannot answer all the questions contained in Sche-
dule A.
While all the continental systems contain provisions relating to the
disclosure of the articles of association, either requiring prospectuses
or requiring other media of publicity, an estimate of the efficiency of these
provisions must take into account a further peculiarity of the method of
capitalization of continental corporations. There are two ways of capi-
talizing a continental corporation in organizing it: either the incorpora-
GESELLsCHAFTEN Au' AxnEN (1930) § 157. At present a few statutes approach the dis-
tinction between authorized and issued capital to the extent that they allow the articles
of association to confer upon the board of directors the power to increase the capital stock
up to a certain amount within a limited period, thus permitting the transfer from the
meeting of shareholders to the board of directors of the power to increase the capital stocL.
As to the French law, see 2 Houz-nr et BosvzEmc, op. cit. supra note 7, n. 832; see further
HALLsTi, op. cit. supra note 11, at 81.
13. In many countries the corporation comes into existence with its registration in the
Commercial Register: (Germany) HANDELSGSFsTEBUCH (1897, 1930) § 200 (1); (Switzer-
land) OBIEGATiONENmE H (1911) art. 623; in other countries it comes into existence upon
the Aling of the articles of association and the other necessary documents with the proper
local court, or with the filing with, and the publication by that court. HArisTxn, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 145; 2 K. WIEAND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 76.
14. Hamburger, Aktiengeselschaft in 2 RECHSVERGLEiCH E Ds HmwomEnnuCH r=
DAS ZIviL=uND HaNDELsRscir (1929) 59, 128.
14a. See infra note 43.
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tors subscribe the whole amount of the capital stock of the corporation
simultaneously, or the capital is to be raised successively" by way of
public subscription.16 The corporation, however, comes into existence
only after the whole capital stock has been subscribed.1"
In most of the continental statutes the protective provisions are appli-
cable only in the case of "successive subscriptions,"1 8 the theory being
that the incorporators as insiders need not be protected in the same way
as other subscribers. It is much the same idea which actuated the legis-
lature of the United States to refrain from requiring a registration state-
ment to be filed with the Securities Exchange Commission with reference
to the preliminary negotiations between an issuer and an underwriter. 1
But capitalization by successive subscription is not usual on the Con.
tinent,20 since it subjects the incorporators to the risk that the public may
fail to subscribe to the whole capital stock during the process of organiza-
tion, and that thus the creation of the corporation may be prevented.
Therefore the incorporators prefer the method of simultaneous subscrip-
tion, which has the further advantage of being less complicated21 and of
requiring less disclosure. But it would be wrong to assume that the financ-
ing of the corporation, from the standpoint of its incorporators, is fin-
ished with the creation of the corporation. In reality, this financing
begins after its creation. Although the incorporators (original sub-
scribers) have seemingly put at the disposal of the corporation the capital
needed, not all of them-this is especially true for the investment banks
15. In subsequent reference to the different types of subscription the term "simultaneoug
subscription, although not accurate translation of the continental terminology used in the
legal literature (Simultangruendung; the French expression is "fondation simultan6e")
will be used for purposes of convenience to refer to the situation when the entire sub-
scription is made by the incorporators; and the term "successive subscription" (Successlv-
gruendung; "fondation successive") will be used to refer to the situation when the Incor-
porators subscribe for a part only of the stock, and the balance is subscribed by outsiders.
16. Though the French Corporation Statute of July 24, 1867, 234 Bulletin des Lois 94,
mentions only the successive subscription and not the simultaneous subscription the latter
is generally recognized by court decisions and text-writers. Thaller, Syndiats Financiers
d'Emission (1911) ANNALES DE Dxorr Conmr=cIA 11.
17. 2 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, TRA=r on DRorr Co iFzcIAL (1929) part 2, n. 687e.
18. A. Wieland, Die Apportgruendung der Aktiengesellschaft (1923) 42 Zarrscna-r urt
Scn-wEimmscHEs RECHT 28a et seq.
19. Federal Securities Act §§ 2(3), 5, 48 STAT. 74, 77 (1933), 19 U. S. C. A. §§ 77b,
77e (1934).
20. A. Wieland, supra note 18, at 28a; Hallstein, op. cit. supra note 11, at 129; Lyo-
CAEm rr RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 17, n. 686; THALLER-PERcERou, TRI.rr ELd.MENTAIDE
Du DRorr CommEcrAL (1925) n. 498.
21. In the case of a successive subscription during the organization of the corporation,
two shareholders' meetings are necessary, one to elect the boards of directors and supervisors,
and the other for resolving definitely upon the creation of the corporation. See for example
Germany: HAMEDLSGESETZBUc (1897) §§ 196, 197. In the case of a simultaneous sub-
scription these two shareholders' meetings are dispensed with.
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(Syndicats d'6mission) which play an important role in corporation finan-
cing-have the intention of remaining permanently the sole share-
holders. 2 On the contrary, they intend to retain only a part of the stock
they have subscribed, and to redistribute the rest as soon as possible,
either by way of public offering or through the channels of the stock
exchange, or, finally, by sales over the counter.?
In view of this situation, the efficiency of the continental systems is
largely dependent upon the requirements of disclosure and the media
of disclosure by which those systems attempt to protect the public at
large, who buy from the original subscriber. Most of the legislatures
22. AUELLER-EtzBACH, DEuscs H sEREcn" (1928) 257; PAss.ow, D= A .m-
G.SELLscHAT (1922) 167; Thaller, supra note 16, at 11. It is usual to distinguish four
different general methods of distribution of securities: The German method, also adopted
in Switzerland, Austria and Hungary; the French method, also adopted in Belgium, Italy,
Holland and Spain; the American method, and, finally, the Engli1.
The English method differs more widely from the other ones than the latter do from
each other. This was especially true up to the world war. But since that time, the
English method has more and more approached the other ones, which is espacially due
to the fact that the English national wealth, too, has decreased. The Englissh method is
characterized by the fact that the English enterprises can draw their capital from private
capitalists connected with them. For this reason the issuance of shares by the enterpris2
itself is more usual than the issuance through a selling syndicate or group. The disctribution
of the shares by the enterprise itself is nevertheless secured by underwriting agreements
made between the issuer and the brokers who redistribute the shares and between the
brokers and the financiers with whom they are connected. In contrast with the English
method all other methods possess the common feature that the shares are distributed by
intermediaries, generally banks who are connected with each other by selling agreements
of various kinds.
Under the German method, the parties to the selling agreement generally form a partner-
ship which, although of temporary duration and limited in scope, has all the other char-
acteristics of an ordinary partnership ("Einheitskonsortium," in contrast with the "Ein-
zelkonsortium" or "Konsortialbeteiligung"). In most cases the investment banks which
form the selling agreement actually subscribe for the stock, rather than merely guarantee
that subscribers will be found.
The main difference between the French and the German methods is that the members
of the French "syndicats de finance," although substantially partners as between them-elves,
are presented by a single member (the so-called "g&ant" or "banquier-chef") who alone
incurs any legal liability with respect both to the issuer and to purchasers of the shares.
Thus in England, as a rule, we find the true underwriter who does not buy the stoc%
but merely guaranties its sale; whereas, under the German and French systems, the inter-
mediaries buy the stock outright and resell it.
The latter method prevails in the United States although the true underwriting is to
be found occasionally, especially in particularly attractive issues. See Keichel, Enissior.s-
geschaeft in 3 REvTSERGLEicENDES Ha mwoERTmuCH (1931) 41; fellerowicz, Emis-
sionsgesclueft in PAL.x-Qurrr.sm, HAMxWOEmRTMUCH DEs BA.Nxvmsms (1933) 173; DvWia,
Tim FhTANciAr Porscn oF CoaPoRAnoNs (3d ed. 1934) 9S0; GALSTON, SacuMr Sr..ICa-Z
OPERAoIINs (2d ed. 1928); Thaller, supra note 16, at 1 et seq.; Schmalenbach, Fn:.:xz;a-
uNGEN (5th ed. 1932) 336 et seq.; for further references see infra, note 24.
23. PAssow, op. cit. su=ra note 22, at 167 et seq.; Scmaursm. cH, op. cit. supra note 22,
at 336 et seq.
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have not fully appreciated this situation, being of the opinion that the
buying public is sufficiently protected by the publication of the articles
of association, which has to be made after the registration of the cor-
poration. But in the several countries where this publication is not
usually required to contain as complete a disclosure as that required in
the case of a "successive subscription," and where the media of dis-
closure applicable after the creation of the corporation are less effective
than those applicable to the "successive subscription," the investor is
insufficiently protected.
While the German and the French laws have recognized these dangers,
they do not seem to have found adequate solutions. The French law,
since the statute of 1907,24 in this respect resembling the Securities Act,
provides for the same disclosure requirements, whether the shares be
publicly issued by the corporation itself to subscribers, or offered for
sale to the public by incorporators, especially "syndicats de finance,"
the French counterpart of underwriters." Furthermore, it prohibits the
negotiation of all shares received in exchange for property until two years
after the registration.26 The German law has found a quite different
solution. It attempts to protect the investing pubic in a twofold man-
ner: first, it has introduced safeguards for the protection of all investors,
especially to prevent overvaluations of property transferred to the cor-
poration in exchange for shares, and prescribes that these safeguards
shall be applicable whether the capitalization takes place in the form
of a simultaneous subscription or of a successive subscription. 7 Second,
on the theory that the original incorporators will normally list their stock
on the stock exchange in order to redistribute the shares,28 the German
Stock Exchange Law (Boersengesetz) of 1896 has safeguarded very
strongly this channel of distribution in order to protect the investor, but
has neglected the other channels for distribution. Unfortunately, the
idea with which the German legislature started was wrong from the be-
ginning, as Max Weber pointed out forty years ago in his famous articles"'
criticizing the draft of the Stock Exchange statute. For the drastic list-
24. E. Wahl, De la PublicitM des Placements de Titres Suivant la Lol du 30.1i907
(1907) J. DES SoCrfTfs 195, 241; 2 HouPnT et Bosvizux, op. cit. supra note 7, n. 1800
et seq.
25. As to "syndicats de fnance" see: Thaller, supra note 16, at 1, 83; YvEs-Lr Roy,
LEs SYTDICATS n'EzussioN (Paris thesis of 1914) ; TEH=LER-PERCEouR, op. cit. supra note 20,
n. 498; 2 Pic. DEs SOCIETis CoIDIERCLAIMS (2d ed. 1925) n. 955; ANxcEON, SNDicATx
FiNrzrARI (1909).
26. See infra page 1150.
27. Germany: HANDELSGESEMZBUC (1897, 1931) § 186.
28. BMUCHr DER BoasES zosTzxoxnsiox (1893) 74.
29. Max Weber, Die Ergebnisse der deutschen Boersenenquete (1894) 44 Zeltschrlft
rnER HwarE~s acTr 1; (1895) 45 id. at 72.
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ing requirements have increased the temptation of many incorporators
to use other channels for the distribution of stock..
0
The result is that the German protective system, viewed as a whole, is
not very well balanced. In this respect, the superiority of the American
protective system over the German is evident, since the American legisla-
ture has made the requirements in the Securities Act fully as stringent
as those demanded under the Securities Exchange Act, thus protecting
all purchasers of the stock in original issues falling within the scope of
the Act, as well as purchasers of listed securities resold on the exchanges.
This lack of harmony of the German law operates particularly to the
detriment of all buyers of unlisted stock who acquire stock distributed
after the registration of the corporation which takes place after the en-
tire capital stock has been subscribed, but before the end of the first
fiscal year of the new corporation. After the end of the first fiscal year,
the buyers are protected by the publication of the balance sheets and the
profit and loss statements, as will be later shown.31 Those investors who
buy unlisted stock prior to this time are protected only by the require-
ment that the corporation disclose the articles of association, and, if prop-
erty other than cash has been taken over by the corporation during the
founding process, by the further requirement that an impartial examina-
tion of the adequacy of the valuation of the property thus transferred
must take place. But this latter requirement is not very well safeguarded
against easy evasion.3" This means that these investors are much less
protected than buyers of listed stock. The discrepancy between the
kinds of protection afforded to the two groups of investors not only
appears in the difference in disclosure requirements, but also in two other
respects: first, the investor in unlisted stock before the end of the first
fiscal tear of the corporation is not safeguarded against the danger that
the financial success of the corporation may be bad from the beginning,
as is the buyer of listed stock, to some extent on account of the fact that
the listing committee of the stock exchange has the power to reject the
application for listing the stock of financially unsound enterprises.P Fur-
thermore, the investor in the unlisted stock of a corporation before the
end of its first fiscal year, where that corporation has been created by in-
corporating an already existent enterprise, other than a corporation, is not
fully protected against the danger that the financial basis of the corpora-
tion is unsound on account of the overvaluation of assets. This danger
does not menace an investor who buys only listed stock of the latter type
of corporation, for the reason that such stock can be officially traded in
only after the lapse of the so-called "Sperrjahr," that is, one year after the
30. Goeppert, Problerae der Prospekthaftung (1935) 24 BAimenmcnv 6S.
31. See infra page 1152. 32. See infra page 1151.
33. Germany: BOESENGESETZ (1896, 1908) § 36.
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registration and after the first publication of a balance sheet and profit
and loss statement 34
Through these various regulations, the German law has broadened the
natural gulf between the type of protection afforded to those investors
who buy unlisted stock prior to the publication of the profit and loss
statement and balance sheet for the first fiscal year and that afforded to
those investors, in both listed and unlisted stock, including subscribers to
increases in capital stock, who buy afterwards, to the detriment of the
buyer who belongs to the former group. The latter group of investors
is protected not only by the required disclosure of the articles of asso-
ciation, but, what is even more important by the required periodical pub-
lication of the balance sheets and profit and loss statements This is
true for all continental legal systems, but has been of especial importance
for the German law since 1931, when the law was altered in order to
approximate the disclosure requirements relating to the profit and loss
statements and balance sheets of all corporations to the stringent rules
which the Listing Committee of the Berlin Stock Exchange had laid down
for corporations with listed stock.3 6
There remains a last principal difference between the Securities Act on
the one hand, and the continental statutes, on the other, namely, the fact
that there is no counterpart in the continental legal systems to the Secu.
rities Exchange Commission, with its power to investigate alleged viola-
tions of the Act 7 to issue stop orders, and to make rules and regulations,
including those governing registration statements and prospectuses.3
Either the fulfillment of the disclosure requirements is safeguarded only
by penal provisions, as in France," or is very insufficiently watched by
the judge in charge of the Commercial Register, as in Germany.40 This
34. Id. § 47. 35. See infra page 1152.
36. Law of September 19, 1931, Reichegesetzblatt I 493.
37. Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 819.
38. §§ 8, 19, 20, 21, 22.
39. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, n. 1078. As to the defects of the French system,
see further Thaller, supra note 16, at 91.
40. "The judge in charge of the Commercial Register is solely under a duty to see
to it that the incorporators petitioning for registration of the corporation have filed In
at least outwardly proper form the necessary articles of association, subscription contracts,
contracts for the transfer of property other than cash to the corporation and the reports
of the boards of directors and supervisors and of the appraisers with respect to such
transactions, documents relating to the appointment of the members of the board of
supervisors (which is done by the shareholders at a shareholders' meeting) and of the
members of the board of directors (which is done either by the board of supervisors,
or by the shareholders at a shareholders' meeting), and finally a signed statement by
the incorporators and the members of the boards of directors and supervisors to the effect
that at least one-fourth of the par value of every share of capital stock has been paid
into the corporation. HANaaaDSrZBUa (1897, 1931) § 195. While the judge Is em-
powered to investigate the truth of the statements filed, if he so desires, he Is under no
duty to do so and usually does not. See further infra note 56.
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lack of a competent authority has prevented the continental legislatures
from making the rules governing disclosure as flexible as is done in the
Securities Act by allowing the Securities Exchange Commission to adjust
the "registration statement and prospectus to the needs and requirements
of various situations."'
We are now prepared to discuss the details of the various protective
systems, and we -will deal first with the protection by disclosure of in-
formation important to the investor.
II
Disclosure and its mechanism
A few general remarks may be permitted as an introduction. The
Securities Act has created for the protection of the investor a uniform
mechanism of disclosure which must be used wherever shares are offered to
the public: a registration statement and a prospectus giving detailed in-
formation. The continental systems have solved the problem of pro-
tecting the investor quite differently. First, as to the scope of publicity,
most of the legal systems by no means go so far as the Securities Act.
Second, instead of the uniform disclosure mechanism used by the Securi-
ties Act they have a mosaic of disclosure mechanismsA2  The most im-
portant part of this mosaic is the articles of association, which constitute
the foundation stone upon which the whole system of protection by dis-
closure rests. The information they contain is always brought up to date
by the fact that all alterations of the articles of association, especially
increases of stock, as well as the yearly profit and loss statements and
balance sheets, must be filed with the local judge in charge of the com-
mercial register and published in official newspapers. Since all this in-
formation is a matter of central public record and publication in most
countries, instead of local record and publication as is the case in the
several American states, the majority of the continental countries do
not feel the necessity of requiring the same coherent disclosure mechan-
ism demanded by the federal government under the Securities Act.
The Articles of Association
The articles of association afford the most important mechanism for
giving information to the original subscriber, the subscriber to increased
capital, as well as to the buyer of securities resold by the incorporators.
Its minimum contents are prescribed by the statutes. The French law is
an apparent exception to this fundamental rule, having no explicit compul-
41. Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 Y=n L. J. 171, 213.
42. France and Belgium do not belong to this group, their statutes being Eecurities acts,
or to be more accurate, securities and securities exchange acts all in one.
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sory requirements relating to the articles of association. However, the
required minimum contents can be deduced a fortiori from the prescribed
minimum contents of the "notice" to be advertised in the "journal offi-
ciel" before any public issuance of the stock can take place.' The facts
which must be disclosed by the articles of association, which must be
signed by the incorporators,4 can be grouped as follows: First, they must
contain all the facts which individualize the corporation; into this group
belong statements as to the name, the seat of its principal office, and the
object of the corporation and its organization." Second, they must
contain information concerning the capital structure of the corporation,
the amount of the capital stock and of the number of shares.40 In those
legal systems which distinguish between bearer shares and shares naming
the shareholder disclosure of information as to whether the shares to be
issued shall be bearer or "named issuee" shares is required. 47  In addi-
tion to this disclosure many of the legal systems require publicity as to
the preferences of individual shares or classes of shares.48  These re-
quirements have the same function as sections 1, 8, 9, 11 of Schedule A
43. The Statute of January 30, 1907, 405 Bulletin des Lois 1433, which contains this
provision is of the greatest importance for the protection of those investors who subscribe
to shares during the process of organization. The fact that the Corporation Statute of
1867 does not fix an exact date for the drawing up of the articles of association subjected
these investors to considerable risk, until the Law of 1907 was enacted. Since the Corpora.
tion Statute of 1867 does not require the publication of the articles of association until
after the creation of the corporation, there are under this Statute no disclosure require-
ments for the protection of the subscriber to the original capital stock. The Statute of
1907 has improved the situation insofar as it fills the gap left open by tile Corporation
Statute of 1867; but it fulfills this task inadequately. 2 Lyozr-GN et RENAUYLT, op. cit.
supra note 17, part 2, n. 770.
44. Germany: HANDELSGESETZBUCH (1897, 1931) § 182; Switzerland, OIOAbONr.INMCnUT
(1911) art. 615.
45. France: Law of January 30, 1907, 405 BuLLETni DEs Lois 1433 art. 3; Germany:
HANDELScESETZBUCH (1897) § 182.
46. France: Law of January 30, 1907, 405 BULLETIN DEs Lois 1433, art. 3; Germany:
HANDELSGESErZBUCH (1897) § 182; Switzerland, OBLOATIOXENRET (1911) art. 616.
47. Germany: HANDELSGESETZDucH (1897) § 183; Italy: CODICE DI COMER IO (1882)
art. 89 (4); Switzerland: OBLIGATIONENRECHT (1911) art. 616 (5).
The continental legal systems recognize not only "named issuee shares" but, following
the French example, bearer shares as well. Concerning the legal nature of the former,
the various legal systems differ widely. According to § 222 of the German -IANDMS0 ESEZ-
BUCE, the named issuee shares are negotiable like bills and notes in the sense that a bona
fide purchaser can acquire 'a good title on the instruments by indorsement, even if the
seller has no title. A transfer on the books of the corporation is necessary only to
legitimate the indorsee as against the corporation. Under the French system, a transfer
on the books of the corporation is necessary to make a transfer valid as against third
parties as well as the corporation.
As regards bearer shares many legal systems allow their issuance only if the whole sub-
scription has been paid in.
48. Germany: HANDELSGESETZBUCH (1897, 1931) § 185.
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of the Securities Act. Finally, the continental statutes seek through dis-
closure in the articles of association to protect the investor against the
watering of capital stock,49 in those cases where the corporation is organ-
ized by the transformation of an existent enterprise (single enterprise
or partnership) into a corporation through the issuance of shares of capi-
tal stock to the former owners of the transformed enterprise in exchange
for their property or proportionate interest therein, or where the con-
tribution of subscribers in exchange for capital stock consists in trans-
fers of tangible or intangible property other than cash (especially patent
rights) to the corporation. The victims of a failure of a corporation due
to overvaluation of property are usually not those persons who have made
the transfers of property for capital stock, because they very quickly get
rid of their stock, but, rather, all other subscribers who have paid in cash,
and who, as outsiders, have not an accurate knowledge of the unsound
capital structure of the corporation. To meet these dangers, most of
the continental statutes prescribe that if the articles of association do
not disclose such transactions, the corporation is not bound to the per-
sons who received shares in exchange for the transfer of property. But
required methods of disclosure of such transactions differ widely under
the various statutes. The older type of legislation, represented by the
French law, requires only a summary description of the assets and of
the number of shares allotted to the vendors of the assets as consideration
for the transfer of the assets to the corporation." The newer type of leg-
islation, represented by the German law, goes a good deal further by
requiring detailed disclosure of the particular types of property making
up the total assets other than cash transferred for the shares, the names of
the transferors and the principles of valuation used. Many statutesP1
extend the same disclosure requirements to transactions by which the
corporation, during the process of organization, acquires property from an
incorporator or from a third person for cash, since absence of such addi-
tional requirements might easily lead to the frustration of the purpose of
the rules requiring disclosure of all agreements relating to transfers of
property in exchange for shares. 2
49. Germany: H1Ar-DE5SrESTZBUCH (1897, 1931) § 186(2); France: Iaw of 30.1.1907,
405 Bur.rErn DES Lois 1433, art. 3.
50. A. Wieland, supra note 18, at 31a; Germany, HANDELSGESM3UCH, § 186 (2).
51. Austria: AxsT mwau.A-4rv (1899, 1925) §§ 7, 20; Germany: H1%EsaEs=r'zuc=
(1897, 1931) § 186(2); Switzerland: OBLiGATwz.'mRcar (1911) art. 619. The French
law has no provisions relating to transfers of property other than cash in exchange for
cash during the founding process. The French courts (Tribunal de Commerce de Ia Seine
of December 12, 1892, 1893, J. DES Soca&Ts 108; Tribunal de Commerce de Ia Seine of
July 23, 1894, Recueil Sirey 1895 II 105) and the French textwriters (Hoinz;x-Bosmuin,
op. cit. supra note 7, n. 720) deny, therefore, that such transactions bind the corporation.
See further: M iN, DiE SACHGRumuEND3m Ar xTixzN cr (1932) 31.
52. A. Wieland, supra note 18, at 31a.
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In Germany, these provisions failed to a large extent,a since incorpora-
tors often evaded them by purporting to pay for the capital stock in
cash, but, in accordance with a previous secret agreement made during
its organization, transferring the contemplated property, instead of the
cash, to the corporation as soon as it was registered. 4 To meet this dan-
ger, the German law prescribes that all transactions concerning transfers
of plants and structures, or of immovables worth more than one tenth
of the capital stock, made during the first two years after the registra-
tion of the corporation, must be ratified by a qualified majority of share-
holders. 5 However, this provision may fail to protect the subscribers,
since the persons interested in such transfers usually have enough shares
to control the votes during the statutory periodY0
In addition to the above disclosure requirements, some statutes, re-
garding every agreement conferring special advantages on any incor-
porator as potentially dangerous to investors, require disclosure of all
such agreements in the articles of association. 7 A few statutes go still a
step further by requiring that the amount of the organization expenses
borne by the corporation must be disclosed. 8
It is necessary at this point to compare the media adopted under the
Securities Act and under the various continental statutes for the disclo-
sure of the information given in the first case in the registration state-
ment, and in the second, in the articles of association.
The registration statement under the Securities Act is made available
to the investor in three ways: (1) it is subject to examination by the
public, (2) the Securities and Exchange Commission must furnish photo-
static copies to all applicants for a reasonable charge, (3) the issuer must
prepare a prospectus summarizing the registration statement.59 The dis-
closure mechanisms used in the various continental countries are differ-
53. This has been admitted by many competent writers: MUFLLER-EZBACH, op. cit.
supra note 22, at 267; Schmalenbach, op. cit. supra note 23.
54. See the citations in the note 53, supra.
55. Germany: HANDELSGESETZBUCH (1897, 1931) § 207.
56. MUELLER-ERZBAcH, op. cit. supra note 22, at 264. The temptation to use this
method will no longer exist if § 36 of the ENnvupx mErs GEsEIZES VEBER ArxT=.
GESELLSCHASTEN ID KOmwAmNDiTOESELLSCHASTEN AUF An=u becomes law, because this
paragraph extends the disclosure requirements and other safeguards to this sort of trans-
action. While under the present law there exists an additional safeguard in that the judge
in charge of the Commercial Register has the power to reject the application for registration
in cases of evasion and, what could be more important, the power to investigate whether
or not an evasion has taken place. Nevertheless, this theoretical power has not hindered
many evasions. MuELLER-ERZBACH, op. cit. supra note 22, at 264.
57. Germany: H.ANDELSoESETZBUcH (1897, 1931) § 186; Italy: CovicE DI CoMasERlo
(1882) art. 89.
58. Germany: HANDELS EsZBvcH (1897, 1931) § 186. This provision has resulted
in the incorporators paying all these expenses. PAssow, op. cit. supra note 22, at 109,
59. §§ 5, 16.
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ent. This is partly due to the difference in methods of organization of
corporations on the continent and in the United States.co Thus, while the
registration of a continental corporation by the filing of its articles of asso-
ciation with a governmental body (usually the judge in charge of the
commercial register) is a procedure which parallels the filing of the regs-
tration statement by an American corporation to the extent that the filing
in both cases takes place after the organization of the corporation, never-
theless it would not be sufficient to perform the function performed by
the registration statement under the Securities Act. For, since the con-
tinental corporation is not fully organized until the sale of its capital
stock, so that the registration can only take place after that sale,
the information disclosed at the time of registration would fail to protect
purchasers of the capital stock.
The disclosure of the articles of association under continental law,
however, is only intended to protect investors other than the incorpora-
tors, since the latter are largely protected in the process of formation by
their inside knowledge. The former type of investors are protected under
a number of continental systems by the requirement that, before public
offerings of shares for subscription may be made, either the articles of
association, or, what is the same, the essential information with respect
to the corporation must be published in official newspapers. This sys-
tem prevails, for example, in France and Belgium."' According to the
French law, every public solicitation to subscribe, for example, a pros-
pectus or an advertisement in newspapers, must repeat the disclosures,
referring to the number of the journal officiel in which the original infor-
mation was published. 2 A similar mechanism of disclosure prevails in
all those countries which require that a public solicitation to subscribe
has to be made in the form of a prospectus. Such a prospectus must con-
tain the articles of association, at least in a condensed and summarized
form, and very often, in addition to it, information relating to the terms
of subscription and payment.' According to this system which is. for
example, in existence in Italy, Portugal, Poland, Switzerland and Hun-
gary, 6 a general publication of the prospectus is sufficient. Contrary to
the provisions of the Securities Act, it need not be handed over or sent
60. See supra page 1136 et seq.
61. Belgium: Law of July 22, 1913, Moniteur July 25, 1913, art. 32(2); France: Law
of January 30, 1907, 405 Bulletin des Louis 1433, art. 3. In case of noncompliance vith
this prescription, the subscription is nevertheless binding. 2 Lyo,.-C,=i et RxAuT,
op. cit. supra note 17, part 2, n. 687b.
62. 2 Pwc, op. cit. supra note 25, n. 1079.
63. Esrsmx, op. cit. supra note 11, at 133.
64. Italy: CoDIic DI ComnirtozmO (1882) art. 129; Switzerland: Bu .,' xsancnxss
BEIXzB= DIE .ABAE DERUNO uN ERtG AZU G DES SCIWIX- 0uLIGATIO.N, IrS Vo.
30. MAERz 1911 Ix BEzug At' AxTIOGEsLITScEAT-, KO. DrrrsEL-_cmLTE2; mm
GEuossEN-sCHArI voar 8. Juti 1919, In KRAr c1T'RLTE Am is. Jux 1919, art. 13.
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to the individual prospective buyer of the shares."" The requirement
under the laws of several continental countries that the articles of asso-
ciation must be filed with a governmental body (usually the judge in
charge of the commercial register) affords no protection to the group of
investors here discussed, because the filing takes place at the end of the
organization of the corporation, and therefore, after the subscription to
the entire capital stock has been made.
While some statutes, such as the Securities Act, 0 allow private solici.
tation without publicity, requiring publication of the articles of associa-
tion or a prospectus only in the case of public subscriptions, other statutes
are more rigorous in effect, for the reason that they allow only public
subscriptions.0 The latter system is represented, for example, by Italy
and Switzerland. A continental representative of the group to which
the Securities Act belongs is France. 8 Due to the fact that the French
statute is very poorly drafted, 9 there are in France many controversies
concerning the question of whether a particular solicitation is public,
rather than private, and whether the publication requirements are there-
fore, applicable. It is now admitted7" that an offering is public not
only given in the case of an offer to subscribe made to the public at large,
but also in the case of an offer made to a large group of the public." Ac-
cording to this interpretation of the Statute, the required "notice" with
its information must be published if the corporation intends to distribute
its shares over its counter. On the other hand, the Statute is inapplicable,
if the shares are offered without any public advertisement. If the
solicitation is admittedly public in nature, however it seems settled
that the publication requirements are not only applicable when the
public offering is made by the corporation itself, but also, when the
shares are offered by or through another person.72 For, it is one of the
main purposes of the French act that the disclosure requirements should
be applicable when the shares are to be distributed by "syndicats de
finance," 3 the French counterparts to the American underwriters, as de-
fined by the Securities Act.
69. §§ 5(2), 2(10). 66. §§ 5, 4(1).
67. See the citations in note 64, supra.
68. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, at n. 1079.
69. Thaller, supra note 16 at page 7.
70. 2 Houpn; et BosviEux, op. cit. supra note 7, at n. 1801, 1803 n. 1; 2 LYox-CAEt
et RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 17, part 2, n. 687 c.
71. For the English definition of public offering, see Nash v. Lynde [1929J A. C. 158,
171, 185; American: Douglas and Bates, supra note 41, at 185.
72. Correctional Tribunal Seine, June 4, 1913 (1914) J. des Soci6t6s 37; DAL.Loz JURis-
PRUDENsCE 1914 II 121, annotated by Charon; 2 HouPiN et Bosv3,ux, op. cit. supra note 7,
at n. 1803.
73. Supra note 22.
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The publication of the "notice" in the journol officiel takes place prior
to the offering of the capital stock for subscription.74 If the shares are
taken by a selling syndicate for the redistribution of shares, the publica-
tion of the "notice" is not necessary, as long as this syndicate does not
offer the shares to the public.7"
All these methods of disclosure suffer from a very serious defect in that
the protection they afford to the subscriber is incomplete to the extent
that they confine themselves to a mechanism of general publicity. This
defect has been remedied by various of the continental legal systems.
Their remedies have in common the quality of affording to the subscriber
the possibility of becoming acquainted with all the essential facts con-
cerning the corporation. In this group belong legal systems which, like
the Finnish," require that the names of the subscribers and the amounts
of their subscription must be disclosed in the articles of association or in
a copy of them, or which, like the Danish,77 require that the subscribers
fill out their names and the amount of their subscriptions on the corpora-
tion's subscription list, at the top of which is a copy of the articles of
association. In this group belong, further, all statutes which demand
that the subscription contract must restate the contents of the prospectus.
Such is the law in Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland.
To this list must finally be added the German, Swiss and Belgian laws,
which require that the subscription contract must be incorporated in a
subscription slip, the latter disclosing all the essential facts, particularly,
the corporation's articles of association."
Additional Disclosure Requirements
The description of the system of publicity for the protection of the
investor would be very incomplete if the disclosure provisions in addition
to those requiring the disclosure of the articles of association were over-
looked.
As a result of unfortunate experiences of investors, all continental
countries include in their corporation statutes special provisions relating
to the type of corporate financing in which property other than cash is
74. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, at n. 1078. 75. Ibid.
76. HAss , op. cit. supra note 11, at 134, n. 76.
77. Law of April 19, 1933, LoVwmsaDmi A Nr. 18. yom 19 April 1930 S. 663-6S7, § 10.
78. MHxsn, op. cit. supra note 11, at 133.
79. Germany: HAENDELSESEZBUCH (1897, 1931) § 189.
The German Law, though not requiring a prospectus unless an application for listing
on the Stock Exchange has been made, provides that where a banking house voluntarily
publishes a prospectus which contains untruths, it is liable to the corporation for such
untruths unless they are made in good faith. § 203. In the case of a public solicitation
to subscribe, the publication of a prospectus is usual. The liabilities for untrue prosp2ctuzes
under § 45 of the German Stock Exchange law protect the individual pur-emszr.
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taken in exchange for shares.80 We can distinguish an older type of
regulation represented by the French law and a newer one represented by
the German law."' According to the French law, and those legal systems
which follow the French pattern, 2 it is not sufficient that the property
received by the corporation in exchange for shares and the "avantages
particuliers" (for example "parts de fondateur ou parts beneficiaires")ra
obtained by the transferrors of the property are described and the num-
ber of shares given in exchange disclosed in the articles of association.
In addition, it is required that the transactions be ratified at two meet-
ings of shareholders held subsequent to the disclosure of this information
in the articles of association, and that, for this purpose, the transactions
be disclosed in a more detailed manner to the shareholders. At the first
of these meetings, the shareholders cannot. ratify the transactions, but
are limited to electing auditors (the so-called "commissaires aux ap-
ports"), to verify their validity. In less complicated cases, the share-
holders themselves may make the verification. Final approval of the
transactions by the shareholders may be given at the second meeting,
but, in the cases where the shareholders have not themselves made the
verification, only if a printed report of the auditors' verification has been
made available to every shareholder at least five days prior to the meet-
ing. Shareholders, who are also vendors of the property involved in such
transactions, have no voting rights at these meetings.84 According to the
judicial interpretation of all these provisions, they are not applicable in
the case where the incorporators have purchased the entire capital stock.81
But even where applicable, they have entirely failed their purpose, either
because the auditors ("commissaires") are mere instruments in the hands
of the incorporators, or because they are incompetent.a0
A French statute of 1893, which has been copied in many countries,87
has been no more successful. Its provisions contain no disclosure re-
quirements, but seek only to strengthen them. This statute prohibits
the negotiation of all shares (the so-called "action d'apport") received in
exchange for transfers of property other than cash within two years after
the registration of the corporation. To make this provision effective, the
80. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, at n. 919.
81. 2 K. Wire.A, HANDELsRECHT (1931) 64 et seq.
82. France: Corporation Statute of July 24, 1867, 234 BULLEM DES Lois 94, art. 4;
Italy: CODICE DI COMMSRCzO (1882) art. 130, 135 (1) (2); Switzerland: ODnuAn1ONa-
aEcnr (1911) art. 619.
83. These "parts" cannot be likened to the founders' shares of the English law, because
the "parts" do not form part of the capital of the corporation as do the founders' shares,
but, rather, give merely a right to share in profits.
84. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, n. 92i et seq.
85. A. Wieland, supra note 18 at 8a.
86. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, at 954.
87. 2 K. Wmi.LAN, op. cit. supra note 81, at 64 n. 3.
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Statute prescribes that the directors of the corporation must stamp the
"action d'apport" with an indication of its nature and the date of the
formation of the corporation. The statute prohibits only the "negotia-
tion" of shares, that is, delivery or indorsement; it leaves open the possi-
bility of an assignment according to the principles established in article
1690 of the Code Civil. 8 Further, the incorporators evaded the restric-
tions on negotiations of such shares by using other devices, for example
the "parts beneficiaires," instead of "actions d'apport."80 To check this
evasion a Statute of 1927 extended the restriction relating to the nego-
tiability of the "actions d'apport" to all other types of shares resorted to
for the purpose of evading the lawY0
The other type of regulation, represented by the German law, requires
the incorporators to make a written report regarding such transfers.f
The transactions must also be investigated and reported by the boards of
directors and of supervisors of the corporationP2 and, finally, by at least
two appraisers 3 These appraisers are nominated either by the compe-
tent local Chamber of Commerce, or, if there is none, by the judge in
charge of the Commercial Register. 4 Opinion regarding the efficacy of
the German appraisal system differs widely. While some authorities in
France propose copying the German provisions, °  the most competent
writers on German corporation law admit that these provisions do not
work as well as has been expected. One result of these provisions seems
to be clear; they have increased 0 the temptation to conceal from the
judge in charge of the Commercial Register the fact that property other
than cash has been transferred to the corporation in exchange for shares
during its organization process. Furthermore, the incorporators make
their report as meaningless as possible, in order to avoid any liability on
account of an untrue report." The reports of the appraisers are de-
fective, too, according to Passow, a very reliable writer. According to
him, it is very often astonishing how little the reports go into details. 3
This usage diminishes to a large extent the validity of the theory that
88. THAIL-PEncERou, op. cit. supra note 20, n. 89. Supra note S3.
90. 2 LYoN-CAw r TRAULT, op. cit. supra note 17, part 2, n. 635.
91. Germany: Handelsgesetzbuch (1S97, 1937) § 191. This report of the incorporators
must contain a detailed disclosure of (a) the terms of the purchase contract bztween the
transferor of the property and the corporation, (b) the terms of any contracts previously
entered into by the transferor and a third party, by means of which the tran-feror
originally acquired the property, (c) the cost and the reproduction values of the prol-rty,
whether or not these values are reported as identical, (d) the earnings on the proplrty
for the two preceding fiscal years, where the property transferred consists of an entire
business enterprise.
92. Id. § 192 (1). 93. Id. § 192 (2).
94. Id. § 192. 95. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, n. 955.
96. Supra note - 97. A. Wieland, supra note 18, at 4Ca.
98. Op. cit. supra note 22, at 123.
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the investors are protected by the fact that everybody can look into the
reports which have to be deposited with the court in charge of commercial
matters as well as with the Chamber of Commerce. The main defect
of the German law as it stands is that the judge in charge of the commer-
cial register is under no legal duty to reject the application for registra-
tion, even if the report of the appraisers is unfavorable, showing, for ex-
ample, that overvaluation of property has taken place.10 Nevertheless,
the German rules are not without any merits. Their importance does not
lie so much in the fact that the reports can be inspected, but is an
indirect one. For the possibility of the appraisers' objecting to the valid-
ity of the transactions involving overvaluation of assets very often hinders
the incorporators from entering into them.101
We have been dealing until now with the disclosure mechanisms closely
connected with the founding of the corporation, protecting especially
those investors buying, either during the process of founding or shortly
afterwards, stock forming part of the original capital stock. We turn
now to the methods used by the continental legal systems to keep the
basic information contained in the articles of association up to date in
the interests of subsequent investors. This is done first by the prescrip-
tion that all alterations of the articles of association 02 must be filed and
registered with the judge in charge of the Commercial Register and pub-
lished in official newspapers;103 then, by the requirement of periodical
publication, concerning the financial status of the corporation.10 4  The
details of these rules, that is, the regulations concerning the contents of
the balance sheets and profit and loss statements, the periods of publica-
tion and the mechanism of publication differ widely. The German Com-
mercial Code, since the Statute (Verordnung) of September 19, 1931,106
contains very detailed provisions concerning the minimum contents of
the required balance sheets and profit and loss statements. It demands,
further, that the balance sheets and profit and loss statements shall be
supplemented by a written report of the board of directors concerning
the financial situation of the corporation. This report must clearly ex-
plain the items in the balance sheets and profit and loss statements, and
99. Germany: HANDELS0ESErZBUCH (1897, 1930) §§ 195 (5), 199.
100. 2 STAUB-PixNER, KOmmETAR ztmr HANDELSGESEnZBUCi (14th ed. 1933) § 193,
Ann. 6. This defect will no longer exist if § 17 of the ENTWURP EiNEs GEssnrZns unit
Ax GEFsGLLSCHArrN TJND KOmmuNDrrESELLsCHApTrN A-up AxnuN (1930) becomes law.
101. PAssow, op. cit. supra note 22, at 123.
102. Only a shareholders' meeting is competent to alter the articles of association under
most statutes. HALtsTrIb, op. cit. supra note 11, 177.
103. Germany: HANDELSGESETZBUCH (1897, 1937) § 277; Switzerland: OBa0ATIoNEN-
REEHT (1911) art. 626.
104. HALrsrmw, op. cit. supra note 11, at 186.
10. Germany: HANDELSGEEZBUCH (1897, 1937) § 260 et seq.
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contain disclosures relating to events of special importance occurring sub-
sequent to the fiscal year. The report must disclose the business relations
existing between the corporation and any subsidiary or affiliated company
and between it and any other corporation with which it has a pooling
agreement. The latter disclosure requirement includes contracts with
such other corporation, relating to supplies of merchandise, financing,
leases and the like. The report must further indicate the degree of the
financial interest in such other corporation or corporations, inclusive of
credits and guaranteeships, as well as any duty it may be under to render
further financial assistance. In addition to the above, the report must,
among other information, contain disclosures relating to shares of the
corporation repurchased and held as treasury shares, or shares sold origi-
nally to third persons closely connected with the corporation and held by
such persons "for the account of" the corporation, shares transferrable
only with the permission of the corporation, and which usually have ex-
traordinary voting privileges, bonuses, any liabilities which are not ascer-
tainable from the balance sheets, the total amounts of salaries received by
members of the boards of directors and of supervisors, given separately
according to whether the salary is received as a member of one type of
board or of the other. The report must be made according to the prin-
ciples of good faith required for an accounting. Disclosures may be
omitted only to the extent that may be demanded by the "preponder-
ant" interests of the corporation or of any corporation with which it
may be associated or of the public.
Although the annual report of the board of directors need not be made
public through the newspapers, as do the balance sheets, but need only be
filed with the judge in charge of the Commercial Register, nevertheless,
the information it contains reaches the investor through the channels of
the financial newspapers.
The balance sheets and profit and loss statements prepared under the
direction of the board of directors are submitted to the shareholders for
their approval at a shareholders' meeting. In addition to approval, the
shareholders must at this meeting vote whether or not to discharge the
directors from liability to the corporation for damages resulting from
any misleading or false statements or omissions in the balance sheet and
profit and loss statement, and, in addition, for any damages which may
have been caused during the accounting period by the mistakes of the
management. Before the balance sheets and the profit and loss state-
ments are handed over to the shareholders to be approved in a share-
holders' meeting they must be verified and examined by one or more
accountants who were appointed either by a vote of the shareholders
in a shareholders' meeting prior to the end of the fiscal year or by the
board of directors or of supervisors.100
106. Id. §§ 262a, b, c.
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These provisions do not, however, afford full protection to the investor.
For, if the shareholders approve a balance sheet and a profit and loss
statement which fail to comply with the statutory schedule, this approval
cannot be attacked like other defective resolutions in a shareholders'
meeting."0 7 The only possible safeguard against failure of compliance
is the fact that accountants must examine and verify the balance sheet
and profit and loss statement, but even this safeguard may be evaded if
neither the shareholders nor the board of directors or supervisors elect
accountants.'0" But an even more serious source of danger to the investor
may be found in the fact that disclosures may be omitted to the extent
that may be demanded by the "preponderant interests" of the corpora-
tion, or any corporation with which it may be associated or of the pub-
lic.' This possible exemption from the disclosure requirements gives the
board of directors a means of legally withholding from the public many
vital facts.109
To complete the mosaic of the disclosure requirements built up in the
continental legal systems for the protection of the investor, we have
only to describe the disclosure mechanisms connected with the increase
of the original capital stock by the issuance of new shares. The dis-
closure system developed in the interest of the subscriber and buyer
of an increase in capital stock in most legal systems is modeled accord-
ing to the pattern used to protect the subscriber of shares of the original
capital stock, but adapted to the changed situation.1 0 Thus, those statutes
which require disclosure through a prospectus in the case of the original
issue, also require a prospectus in the case of an issuance of shares of
the increased capital stock."' The prescriptions concerning the minimum
content of the latter type of prospectus take into account that the issuer
is a going concern with a financial history. For this reason the Swiss
law requires that the prospectus contain a statement concerning the
economic history of the corporation; and the French Law requires that
the prescribed "'notice" contain the balance sheet for the last fiscal year.11"
Those statutes, which, like the German law, require that the subscriber
to the shares of the original capital stock must sign for the subscription
on a subscription slip containing the articles of association and the con-
tract of subscription, extend this requirement to the case where the
subscription is for shares issued as part of an increase of capital stock,
107. Id. § 261e.
108. They cannot be forced to elect accountants.
109. Nussbaunm, Garanien aktienrechtlicher Publizitael (1932) 61 JvuRsnscuE WocuM-
scn 'T 2583; Lansburgh in (1932) BArx 965.
110. Germany: HaNErsGEsE=ZBUcu (1897, 1931) §§ 279, 281.
111. Switzerland: Law of July 8, 1919, art. VIII.
112. France: 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, n. 1080; Switzerland: HALLSTEIN, op, cit.
supra note 77, at 186; as to the required notice see supra note 43.
[Vol. 441154
HeinOnline -- 44 Yale L. J. 1154 1934-1935
SECURITIES LEGISLATION
and add to it by requiring that the subscription slip in the latter situation
contain also the date of the resolution of the shareholders for the increase
of stock.,-3
Concerning the general attitude towards the disclosure requirements
in the various Continental countries, there would appear to be a growing
tendency to enlarge the field of publicity. This is well illustrated by
the fact that all amendments of older statutes enlarge the list of facts
which are to be disclosed, as is clearly shown, for example, by the recent
development of the German law.1 4  For this reason the French law,
which has insufficient disclosure requirements, has been for many years
the subject of severe attacks. Numerous drafts have been proposed to
enlarge the disclosure requirements, but until now without any success."1
III
There remain for consideration1 the remedies available to a defrauded
investor. Under American law, these are contained mainly in sections
11 and 12"1 of the Securities Act: section 11 concerning untrue regis-
tration statements, and section 12 dealing with failure to file a registra-
tion statement and with untruths in prospectuses or oral communications.
These remedies being not all-inclusive, are supplemented by all other
rights of action that may exist at law or in equity."" We have to
distinguish two remedies, rescission and the action for damages.
Rescission
Section 11 of the Securities Act, as passed originally, altered the
common law by giving the defrauded purchaser of a security the right
to recover from all persons enumerated in section 11 the consideration
paid upon the tender of such security. In the amended section 11, the
action for rescission is withdrawn. Consequently the question whether
that right of action is available to a purchaser against any other person
than his immediate seller is to be decided by common law principles.
Since the common law remedy of rescission can only be invoked by the
buyer against his immediate seller, the buyer is without the remedy of
rescission against the persons enumerated in section 11. He cannot
113. Germany: ]HA-DEL sG EsEmc (1597, 1931) § 281.
114. Supra note 105.
115. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, at n. 10S et seq.
116. A description of the criminal provisions of the continental laws schall not ha given
because they are not particularly interesting.
117. § 17 of the Federal Securities Act "is concerned only with violations that give
rise to injunctive actions by the Commission or to criminal proceedings when there is
wilful avoidance of its specific terms." LA sER and Gmn'aDr, Fgm. S.cunm rs Acr
PROCEDURE (1934) 211.
118. § 16 of the Federal Securities Act.
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rescind against them because there is no contractual relationship between
him and these persons." 9 This, even defeats the possibility of rescission
as against the issuer of the securities, since the latter usually does not
sell the securities. immediately, but uses an intermediary for the dis-
tribution of the shares. 2 °  Thus, under the Securities Act as it now
stands, the action for rescission'is governed by section 12, permitting
the purchaser to rescind the purchase against his immediate seller if
the security has been sold in violation of section 5, which requires regis-
tration by the issuing corporation, or, if the buyer has been induced
to enter into the bargain by untrue statements or omissions in a pros-
pectus or oral communication, unless the seller can sustain the burden
of proving that he was excusably ignorant of the untruth or omission.
While the continental legal systems reach results somewhat similar
to those obtained under the Securities Act, the ways by which they
reach these results are dissimilar. The continental legal rules cannot
be easily described. The only safe statement that can be made is that
the different legal systems try to limit the power of rescission in the
interest of the creditors of the corporation. But the exact boundaries
of this limitation are not always certain. This is especially true with
respect to the German law.
According to the German system, followed in Austria and Switzer-
land,"' the subscriber of shares (as distinguished from a buyer) induced
to subscribe by mistake, fraud or duress generally cannot invoke a
rescission against the corporation, although this denial of a remedy
departs from the principles governing ordinary contracts.1 22  But how
far this rule reaches is a subject of much controversy. While the German
Supreme Court has conclusively laid down this rule only where the
attempt was to rescind the subscription contract after the corporation
had been registered, 23 and has stated in an obiter dictum that an in-
vestor can rescind his subscription for mistake, fraud, or duress as long
as a company is not registered, 24 nevertheless, it is doubtful whether
the subscriber has a power to rescind, even up to this moment. Assuming,
however, that the subscriber has this power, he can, if he is an incor-
porator, prevent the registration of the corporation by withdrawing 'his
119. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act (1933) 43 YALP L. J. 227, 231.
120. Barnett, supra note 1, at 13.
121. SILBENAGEL, DiE GRUEDUNG DER A wa'EsEu..scmi/rr (1907) 147; HmI"=TN
op. cit. supra note 11, at 136.
122. Germany: BuERGERmLcnss GESTxZBUCH (1896) §§ 119, 123; 2 K. WuLAND, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 26.
123. German Supreme Court, May 8, 1908, 68 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts In
Zivilsachen 344; German Supreme Court, April 4, 1916, 88 Entscheidungen des Reicasgertchts
in Zivilsachen 187. STAuB-PIm'NE, op. cit. supra note 100, at § 189, Anmerkung 25.
124. German Supreme Court, June 10, 1913, 82 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts. In
Zivilsachen 375. STAUB-PINNER, op. cit supra note 100, at § 189, Anmerkung 26a.
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application for registration, or, if he is merely a subscriber, by obtaining
an injunction forbidding the incorporators to apply for registration;
and may thus accomplish a rescission before the corporation can register
and thereby defeat his right of action.es
Most of the arguments of a purely dialectical character which have
been advanced to sustain the rule against rescission, are not worth
mentioning. There are only two arguments which are worth mentioning:
the advocates of the rule lay stress on the theory that the subscription
of stock is not only a contract between the corporation and the sub-
scriber to take part in the capitalization of the corporation, but is also
a public declaration of intention to be unconditionally liable up to the
amount subscribed, a declaration upon which the public can rely.Y
In the last analysis this argument rests upon the theory that the capital
stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the benefit of the creditors
of the corporation, from which it follows that the capital stock can
not be diminished by allowing rescission of the subscription. The other
argument advanced is a practical one: It has been pointed out that the
temptation to rescind is very great only when the financial situation of
the corporation is embarrassed and it is to be reorganized. And in
this situation, to allow descission would add to the difficulties of reorgan-
ization of such embarrassed corporations. -
The situation of a buyer of stock, defrauded by his purchaser, is
materially different from that of a subscriber to stock.' s A defrauded
buyer, that is, a buyer induced to buy stock by the misstatement of a
material fact, wilfully made, concerning the security, has undoubtedly
a right to rescind as against his purchaser. In this case the arguments
against rescission cannot be advanced, because the buyer's rescission
does not diminish the capital stock. Though there are very few deci-
sions covering this field, it seems to be settled that the buyer of stock
has a right to rescind even against the corporation, if the corporation
has sold its own repurchased stock and has defrauded the buyer during
the bargain. -  From the general principle of the German civil law
concerning rescission for fraud, however, it may be deduced that, unless
the seller was aware of the fraud, the buyer has no right to rescind
against his seller where the fraud was committed not by the seller him-
self, but rather, by the issuer (or his agents).Y° Further, the buyer
125. GoLnscumnT, DIE Ax FIESErESCHAIT (1927) § 189, Anmerkung 26.
126. GOLDSCH=T, op. cit. supra note 125, at § 189, Anmerkung 25; K. WI=r.A,, op.
cit. supra note 9, at 24, note 26.
127. Veit Simon, DIE thERWAELZtWG DEs A X IENBESITES SiTEs ,s DER Anrio:.i; %ur
DIE AXT=EGEsErLsCnAFS (1913), 7 Leipziger Zeitschrift 11.
128. German Supreme Court, June 2, 1916, 88 Entscheidungen des Relchsgerichts in
Zivisachen 271; Goldschmit, op. cit. supra note 125, § 189, Annerkung 30.
129. See the citations in the preceding note.
130. Germany: BUERGEEmLCHES GISErBUCH (1896) § 123.
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has no right of action for breach of warranty of quality against his
seller if the value of the shares does not come up to the purchase price.
131
Only a few legal writers disagree with the principles developed by the
German Supreme Court. They try to limit the fundamental rule by
pointing out that the reasons advanced by the advocates of the rule
against rescission hold good only in cases in which the capital stock of
the corporation is diminished by allowing a rescission, as partly shown
by the fact that nearly all decisions of the German Supreme Court laying
down the rule dealt with bankrupt corporations. These dissenting writers
propose therefore to amend the rule by allowing rescission wherever the
refunding can take place out of an earned surplus.1" 2 The German
Supreme Court, however, has declined to follow these suggestions be-
cause their application would be too difficult.U
3
The opinion advanced by the dissenting German textwriters which
resembles the principle laid down by the English courts and those of
Massachusetts, denying rescission after insolvency of the corporation,1' 4
bridges the gulf between the German and the French point of view.
While the French law permits on principle the rescission of a subscription
induced by fraud or mistake, it is unanimously held by the French
courts that the power to rescind cannot be invoked to the detriment of
creditors of the corporation.3 5 If, for example, the creditors of a cor-
131. German Supreme Court, January 26, 1915, 86 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerlchts
in Zivilsachen 146; GOLDSCH=r, op. cit. supra note 125, § 189, Anmerkung 33.
The German law concerning warranty of quality is similar to the American law under
the Uniform Sales Act. Kessler, Kaufertrag, Sachmingel, in 4 RECITsVEIr0LriICIIrNDES
HANDW6RTERBUCH (1932) 727, 754.
132. 2 K. WiEAND, op. cit. supra note 9, at page 26; Breit, Ansprueche der Aklionaere
gegen die Aktiengesellschaft aus dem Erwerb der Aktien (1915) 76 Zeitschrift fuer Handels-
recht 415.
133. German Supreme Court, April 4, 1916, 88 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerlchtg in
Zivilsachen 189; 2 K. WNIELAzm, op. cit. supra note 9, at 26, n. 32.
134. Henderson v. Royal British Bank, 7 E. & B. 356 (Q. B. 1857); Dalles v. Turquand,
L. R. 2 H. L. 325, 344 (1867); Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253
Mass. 205, 148 N. E. 609 (1925). Concerning the majority rule, see BALLANTIM, CoR-
PORATrONS (1927) 149 et seq.
135. Many questions concerning rescission are left in doubt by the decisions of the
French courts. It is not settled whether, or to what extent the rescission of a subscription
for fraud makes the corporation void from the beginning. See HWmARD, Tu oxu rr
PRATIQUE DFs NuLmgS DS Socifrfs Er naS SOCIETS DE FAIT (1926) 112 et seq.
It is one of the main defects of the French corporation law that nearly every violation
of the rules concerning the founding of the corporation makes the corporation void from
the beginning. Law of July 24, 1867, 234 BUr.rzrnr DES Lois 94, art. 22, 23, 24, 25, 41,
42-56. The French courts have only inadequately tried to improve this situation by
treating such corporations as having a sort of de facto existence. In contrast to tho
American law, which requires a quo warranto proceeding to liquidate the de facto corpora-
tion, every shareholder, shareholder's personal creditor and creditor of the corporation
has a right of action to declare the corporation void. As soon as the corporation has
been declared void by a decree of the court, it is liquidated. For a comparison of the
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poration who have not received full satisfaction of their claim sue the
shareholder directly, as they may under French law, the defrauded
shareholder is not allowed to rescind by way of defense. The same
principle governs if the liquidator sues for the payment of the subscrip-
tion price. 20
Action for damages
There are some striking discrepancies between the American and the
continental laws relating to the investor's action for damages. Under
the provisions of section 11 of the Securities Act, any person acquiring
a security may invoke an action for damages upon showing proof that
on the date the registration statement became effective it contained
(1) either an untrue statement of a material fact or (2) omitted to
state a material fact required to be stated therein, or necessary to make
the other statements not misleading. Departing from common law
principles governing actions for misrepresentation and fraud, section 11
does not require that the complaining purchaser be actually misled by
the registration statement; for the statute creates an absolute presump-
tion that the purchase is made on the strength of the facts set out in
the registration statement. Since the amendment of the Act, this rule
is, however, subject to one important exception to the effect that, if the
purchaser has acquired the security after the issuer has published an
earning statement covering a full year subsequent to the effective date
of the registration statement, the purchaser must prove that he relied
on the untruth or omission in the registration statement.
The liability under section 11 falls not only upon the immediate seller,
but also upon a large group of persons, issuers, directors, and officers,
experts and underwriters, who can be sued jointly and severally. While
the liability of the issuer is an almost absolute one,'1 7 all other persons
made liable by section 11 may escape liability under the specific de-
fenses enumerated in the Act. Thus, for example, these persons can
defend an action for damages brought against them by proving that
they had severed relationships with the issuer or attempted to do so
French and American systems, see Kesler, Die Mangeihafte Ahtiengesellschaft des ncrd-
amerikanischen Relchts als de facto corporation, corporation by etopprl and tit nership
im Vergleicl mit der societe de fait par actions des franzoesichen Recdts (1929) 3
ZrrscEmurr ro AUSITA ISCHS mm nTEnATIONALs PRATPMnT 46S et sq. The
Belgian and Italian law have diminished the number of the defects which make the cor-
poration void from the beginning. See 2 K. WnXAsm- ,, op. cit. supra note 9, at 83.
136. 1 CopPER PorER, T Am DES SocmrzS AzmOramnS (3d ed. 1925) n. 50; 1 Houan.
et Bosvinux, op. cit. supra note 7, n. 646; Paris, Cour d'Appel, April 26, 1877; Dalloz
Jurisprudence, 1879 II 81. French Chambre des Requates, November 8, 19D4, Gazette des
Tribunaux, 1905 I 29; French Cour de Cassation, February 10, 1868, DaIloz Jurisprudence,
1868 I 379.
137. Federal Securities Act § 11 (b).
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before the registration statement became effective and, in addition, by
further proving that they had notified the Securities Exchange Com-
mission and the issuers at that time of the steps taken and that they
would not be responsible for the registration statement.138 Further-
more, they can escape liability by proving that the registration statement
became effective without their knowledge, 19 or, finally, by proving a
reasonably grounded belief in the accuracy and completeness of the
registration statement, arrived at after reasonable investigation.14
Finally, the defendant may minimize the damages insofar as he can
prove that they were not a consequence of the untruth in the registration
statement.' 41 The measure of damages recoverable under Section 11
varies according to whether the purchaser has sold or retained the
securities and if he has sold them, whether sale was made before or
after the suit was begun.142 In no case can the purchaser recover more
than the price at which the securities were offered to the public.
1 43
The liability of the seller for damages under section 12 of the Securi-
ties Act is governed by the same principles as the liability to refund
the purchase price under the same section.
The various continental laws differ widely with respect to the main
ideas as well as to the details of regulation. The difficulty in giving
an adequate picture of the provisions of the continental laws with respect
to the investor's right of action for damages is increased by the fact that
many of the provisions are not at all clear. This lack of lucidity which
characterizes especially the German and the Swiss provisions is explained
by the fact that the fundamental liability provisions are only indirectly
connected with the issuance of shares and are mainly to be found, for
example, among the general provisions concerning irregularities during
the founding of the corporation. It is rather doubtful to what extent
the remaining gaps can be filled out by the general principles of delictual
liability.
The rules of the French law are much less complicated. They are
characterized by two main peculiarities: first, the most important pro.
visions imposing liability on the guilty persons in the interest of a de-
frauded investor cannot be found in the corporation act. For, while
the French corporation Act 44 contains a very broad provision imposing
on incorporators and administrators a liability for damages, if the cor-
poration has been declared void for non-compliance with the statutory
requirements, nevertheless, this important paragraph covers only a very
small sector of the field we are now interested in. The section is of
importance, for example, in cases of fictitious subscriptions, 1' or if the
138. Id. § 11 (b) (1). 139. Id. § 11 (b) (2).
140. Id. § 11 (b) (3). 141. Id. § 11 (e).
142. Id. § 11 (e). 143. Id. § 11 (g).
144. Law of July 24, 1867, 234 BuLLrm Ds Lois 94, art. 42.
145. French Cour de Cassation, August 6, 1862, Dalloz Jurisprudence 1862 I 428,
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prescribed twenty-five percent on each share has not been paid in,"'
or if the publicity requirements of the act have not been complied
with.147 But, since it stipulates as a condition precedent to any liability
that the corporation must have been declared void, it does not cover,
for example, the cases of a fraudulent over-valuation of assets, 4 ' of
untrue statements or omissions in the prescribed "notice," in the journal
officiel or in the balance sheets and profit and loss statements of pros-
pectuses. 149 These very important situations, however, are covered by
the general and broad principles of the law of torts. The fact that the
famous article 1382 of the Civil Code, invoked by the courts to cover
this situation, gives everybody who has suffered damages a right of action
against the guilty wrongdoer,1O has enabled the French courts, especially
in the famous Credit Mobilier Cases, to draw the border of civil liability
as wide as necessary.' 5
The question arises at this point as to who may be made liable for
damages under the continental laws, and to whom, and under what
conditions they might be liable.
The issuing corporation under continental law is never liable to a
subscriber for damages for untrue statements. Those legal systems
which do not allow a rescission of a subscription for mistake, fraud or
duress cannot allow an action for damages to a defrauded subscriber
against the corporation, or else the restrictions concerning rescission
could easily be evaded. This principle is clearly stated by the German
courts and by the German and Swiss writers' 2 Since it could not be
ascertained whether the problem has been the subject of decisions of
French courts, the only safe statement that can be made with respect
to the French law is that the French writers do not mention any liability
146. French: Cour de Cassation, January 27, 1873, Dalloz Jurisprudence, 1873 I 331.
147. France: Law of July 24, 1867, 234 B3ULtLrLn DEs Lois 94, art. 56.
145. HsrD, op. cit. supra note 135, at n. 257 et seq.
149. 2 Pic, op. cit. supra note 25, at n. 1028.
150. In this respect the French law differs widely from the German and the common
law, both of which have no such broad principle of delictual liability, but, rather, only a
set of single delicts. See KESSLE.R, DiE FArm~.arsioEmr t iOmRD. mEnmsc=r, DELr-
Tmacn=r (1932) 61. Concerning wilful harms see, however, the statement of Lord Bowen in
Skinner & Co. v. Shev & Co. [18931 1 Ch. 413, 422.
151. Cour de Paris, August 1, 1868, Dalloz Jurisprudence, 1869 II 65; French Cour
de Cassation, May 7, 1872, Dalloz Jurisprudence, 1872 I 233; Cour de Cassation, November
11, 1873, Recueil Sirey, 1874, I 97 annotated by Labb6; see further 2 Vavasseur, Trait6
des Sodct~s civiles et commerciales (5th ed. 1897-1904) n. 91-133 and Wiener, Die Erricbtung
den Aktiengesellschaft und die Grunderverantwortlichkeit (1379) 24 Zeitschrift fur Handel-
recht 1; (1880) 25 id. at 8, n. 18.
152. German Supreme Court, March 14, 1903, 54 Entscheidungen des Reicbsgerichts in
Zivilsachen 128; German Supreme Court, April 4, 1916, 88 Entscheidungen des Reich--gericdts
in Zivilsachen 187; Silbernagel, op. cit. supra note 121, at 147.
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of the corporation for damages based on the ground that the corporation
through its agents has committed a wrong on the defrauded subscriber.
According to the decisions of te German Supreme Court, the situation
of a buyer of stock is quite different, due to the same practical con-
siderations already discussed in connection with rescission. He is granted
an action for damages against the corporation if he has, for example,
purchased treasury shares from it, in reliance on untrue statements made
by its principal officers." 3
The problem arises next, as to what persons other than the corporation
might be liable for damages. The great difficulties we shall meet here
do not concern so much the problem as to what persons are liable, as
the problem to whom these persons are liable, and under what conditions.
In order to determine who else might be liable, it is first necessary
to consult the provisions providing for liabilities for non-conforming
with the rules regulating the formation of the corporation. In some
countries we can find broad rules which impose civil liability on those
persons to whom irregularities in the organization process may be attrib-
utable. According to the German law, the incorporators and the members
of the boards of directors and of supervisors are liable for untrue state-
ments made in the documents which have to be filed for purposes of
registration with the judge in charge of the commercial register.114 The
same liability is extended to all persons who participate in any irregu-
larities which may occur during the organization process."" From this
point of view those persons, for example, who have transferred over-
valued assets to the corporation in exchange for shares are liable.160
Similar provisions exist under the Swiss law." 7 In the case of the French
law, these persons are liable under the provisions of the corporation
statute or the general principles of delictual liability.Y8
So much for the persons who might be liable for irregularities in the
founding of a corporation. Coming now to the question, to whom these
persons might be liable, we must distinguish an older type of legislation,
represented by the French law, a more modern type, represented by the
German law, and finally a type combining these two, represented by
the Swiss law.
According to the French law, incorporators or directors who are guilty
of irregularities which have made the corporation void from the begin-
153. GOLDSCumir, op. cit. supra note 125, § 189, Aninerkung 30; see further the citations
in the preceding note.
154. Germany: HANDELsrEsE.zBuc (1897, 1931) §§ 202 (1) (2) 204. The members
of the board of directors and of the board of supervisors are only secondarily liable.
155. Id. § 202 (5). 156. Id. § 202.
157. Switzerland: OBr~ATrzO E sr (1911) art. 671.
158. S-upra note 1160 et seq.
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ning are liable only to the shareholders, and not to the corporation; but
where they may be guilty of fraudulent devices other than such as void
the corporation, they are liable in damages to both parties.ls' To the
group of shareholders who can sue for damages belong not only the
original subscribers, but also all buyers of stock who have acquired stock
either in reliance on the regularity of the founding or on the untrue
statements." 9 If the corporation has been declared void, the share-
holders can claim the damage they have suffered by the premature
liquidation of the corporation.l c In other cases the damages are meas-
ured either by the difference between the subscription price and the
market value of the shares, or by the amount of the whole consideration
paid for the subscription. 1 If they have sold their shares, they may
get the difference between the purchase price and the selling price -
In all cases, however, the courts have a very wide discretion in measur-
ing the damages.3
The German law has reached an opposite solution. According to the
special provisions of the German Commercial Code, the guilty incor-
porators and their associates are not liable to the individual shareholder,
but only to the corporation, itself.10 If, for example, they have made
untrue statements as to the total subscription of the capital stock, they
have to subscribe the missing balance. If the shares are not paid up
to at least one quarter of their nominal value, they have to pay the
unpaid instalments. If property transferred in exchange for shares has
been overvalued, they have to pay the difference between the real and
the estimated value of the property.'1 The power to decide whether
the guilty persons may be sued is within the discretion of the board
of directors, or, if the latter are to be sued, the board of supervisors.
A suit must be brought, if it is desired, by either a majority in voting
power of the shareholders or by a minority of one tenth in amount of
the capital stock' 6
According to the Swiss law, every person who has taken part wilfully
158a. Concerning the corporation's right of action and the right of the dhareholder to
sue in the name of the corporation, see the annotation of Labb in Recucil Sirey 1835 I 97.
139. French Cour de Cassation, December 30, 1872, Dalloz Jurisprudence, 1873 I 333;
French Cour de Cassation, July 2, 1873, Dalloz Jurisprudence, 1874 I 49.
160. Wiener, supra note 151, at 6, n. 13.
161. Wiener, supra note 151, at 7.
162. SILBmmTAmEL, op. cit. supra note 121, at 426.
163. Ibid.
164. Germany: HMaNEaGSGETSZBUci (1879, 1931) § 202. It is rather doubtful whether,
in addition to this liability to the corporation, the persons enumerated in § 202 are liable
to shareholders in case of intentional harm. See GoLsscnrn=, op. cit. supra note 125,
§ 202, anmerkung 12.
165. GoLuscn=sr, op. cit. supra note 125, § 202, anmerkung S.
166. Germany: HANDEwsGEsLrzBUCH (1879, 1931) § 268.
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in irregularities during the formation process is liable for damages to
the corporation as well as to the individual shareholder.10 7 But the
corporation has a prior right insofar as a vote in a shareholders' meet-
ing discharging the persons liable precludes the individual shareholder
who has either assented, or who does not start a suit within six months
after the vote, from bringing suit against the persons thus discharged.108
So much for the persons liable for irregularities in the founding of
the corporation, and the parties to whom they may be made liable. The
various laws have similar provisions against fraudulent transactions in
connection with the increase of the capital stock.109
To the group of persons who might be liable, either belore or after
the founding, belongs finally the bank which has made untrue statements
in prospectuses or the like, unless it can sustain the burden of proving
excusable ignorance of the untruths.170 According to the German law
the bank is liable only to the corporation itself.'
IV
In summing up, if we compare the continental security legislation
with the Securities Act, we must reach the conclusion that the investor
is a good deal better protected under the Securities Act than under the
various continental laws. The writer has no doubt that the superiority
of the Securities Act over all continental laws will strengthen the posi-
tion of the proponents of reform of the continental systems; and that
the Securities Act will serve as a model for future continental legislation.
The superiority of the Securities Act is especially evident in two
respects: first, in the respect that the Act creates a permanent super-
visory body with broad powers to administer its provisions,'7 2 a feature
which none of the continental legal systems possess,-17 second, in the
respect that the disclosure requirements under the Securities Act go a
good deal further than those under the various continental systems.
Compared with the disclosure requirements under the Securities Act,
those under many continental legal systems, especially the French law,
are trivial. We cannot find any counterparts in the continental statutes
to many of the provisions contained in the 34 sections of Schedule A
of the Securities Act. For example, the continental statutes do not
contain requirements concerning disclosure of security ownerships, as
167. Switzerland: Obligationenrecht (1911) art. 671.
168. Id. art. 675.
169. HALLSTEm, op. cit. supra note 11, at 185 et seq.
170. siLBENAGuL, op. cit. supra note 121, at 421; Germany: HANDELSOESETZMUCH (1879,
1931) § 203.
171. Germany: HANDELSOESEZBUCH (1879, 1931) § 203.
172. Supra page 1142. 173. Supra page 1142.
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do sections 6, 7, and 10 of Schedule A; nor are there provisions prescrib-
ing disclosures of the salaries of directors and other officers in most
of the continental statutes. Only the German law approaches section
14 of Schedule A, dealing with disclosure of such salaries. None of
the continental statutes require disclosure of every "material contract"
such as is required by the Securities Act; nor is there a requirement of
specific information concerning the purposes of issues to be sold, such
as is required by section 13 of Schedule A of the Securities Act. The
reason that sections 15, 17, and 18 of Schedule A of the Securities Act,
requiring disclosure of commissions paid to underwriters, have no real
counterparts in the continental laws is that the continental legislators
have been of the opinion that the investor is sufficiently protected by
the prohibition of the issuance of shares below par and by the require-
ments that any special advantages given by the corporation to its in-
corporators, and any expenses of incorporation which have to be borne
by the corporation, have to be disclosed. That the continental legal
systems have left a gap open in this respect is proved by the fact that
the commissions which are to be paid to the banks for the distribution
of shares, even if these commissions mean that in effect the shares are
being issued below par, 74 are not required to be disclosed and such
disclosure is in most countries omitted in actual corporate practice.-15
The lack in the continental laws of requirements parallel to those
of the Securities Act is due in the case of some of the requirements,
however, to the less complicated financial structure of the continental
corporations. This is the reason for the lack of disclosure requirement
relating to shares without par value; for the continental laws, with the
exception of Belgium,17 do not recognize this class of shares. The same
is true for the lack of disclosure requirements concerning certificates
of deposit and voting trusts, both being either unknown or of no import-
ance in most continental countries. 77
174. The legal validity of such "evasions" of the prohibition to " sue hares, below
par under the German law seems to be unanimously admitted. See Ruth, Eigae Aktien
und Verwaltungsaktien (1928) 44 (Gesellschaftsrechtliche Abhandlungen, herausgegeben von
Nussbaum); SrAuB-PrzNRn, op. cit. supra note 100, § 184, Anmerkung 1. Under the
French law, however, the validity of such transactions seems to be rather doubtful. Se
2 LyoN-CAmr et RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 17, n. 725 et seq. In many cases the
commissions paid to the investment bankers consist in the difference betv:een the sub-
scription price they have to pay and the redistribution price. RUTr, at 44.
175. 2 FE3amcQ, DROw COMUMCcAL BracE (1930) n. 851.
176. See PAssow, op. cit. supra note 22, at 160 et sceq.; Flechteim, Vor Altenzwesen
in den Vereinigten Staaten (1929) 3 ZEmsanu ru %usR ,sLrDDIsc:aEs uz.D nr.ri-
NATIONALan PpavATvaT 117 et seq.; HALSTEIm, op. cit. supra note 11, at 100; 1 Eissnnm,
DAS mmma FN.D.'IscHE 3ANKWeFSEN (1916) 106 et seq.
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